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Partyism
Cass R. Sunsteint
ABSTRACT
"Partyism" is a form of hostility and prejudice that operates across
political lines. For example, some Republicans have an immediate
aversive reaction to Democrats, and some Democrats have the same
aversive reaction to Republicans, so much so that they would discriminate
against them in hiring or promotion decisions or in imposing
punishment. If elected officials suffer from partyism-perhaps because
their constituents do-they will devalue proposals from the opposing
party and refuse to enter into agreements with its members, even if their
independent assessment, freed from partyism, would be favorably
disposed toward those proposals or agreements. In the United States,
partyism has been rapidly growing, and it is quite pronounced-in some
ways, more so than racism. It also has a series of adverse effects on
governance itself, above all by making it difficult to enact desirable
legislation and thus disrupting the system of separation of powers. Under
circumstances of severe partyism, relatively broad (though not
unconstrained) delegations of authority to the executive branch, and a
suitably receptive approach to the Chevron principle, have considerable
appeal as ways of allowing significant social problems to be addressed.
This conclusion bears on both domestic issues, including environmental
protection, and foreign affairs, including authorizations for the use of
military force.
I. THE GOAL
With respect to prejudice and hostility, the English
language has a number of "isms." Racism, sexism, classism, and
speciesism are prominent examples. I aim to coin a new one
here: partyism. The central idea is that merely by identifying
with a political party, a person becomes hostile to the opposing
Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. This essay is the
written version of the keynote lecture for the 2014 annual symposium of The University
of Chicago Legal Forum. Allowances should be made for an essay originally intended for
oral presentation. Special thanks to the audience at The University of Chicago on that
occasion and, above all, to Matthew Lipka for extraordinary research assistance.
1
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
party and willing to believe that its members have a host of
bad characteristics.'
My major suggestion here is that partyism is real and on
the rise, and that it has serious adverse consequences for
governance, politics, and daily life. In some ways, partyism is
now worse than racism. I also offer a few words about its causes
and consequences and make some suggestions about what might
be done about it. Under conditions of severe partyism, it
becomes unusually difficult to address serious social problems,
at least through legislation. To that extent, the system of
separation of powers-which already imposes a series of barriers
to legislative initiatives-becomes genuinely unsettled. Some of
its desirable constraining functions are aggravated; the degree
of constraint turns excessive.
My principal proposal involves the importance and the
value of grants of discretionary authority to the executive
branch. I shall argue that, amidst high levels of partyism, such
grants can be highly desirable, at least if it is agreed that
serious social problems need to be addressed. 2 This conclusion
has implications for judicial treatment of executive action,
especially in areas of law in which the executive is interpreting
vague or ambiguous statutory terms. Those who object to
executive discretion, and to accompanying judicial doctrines,
have things exactly backwards, at least under conditions of
severe and persistent partyism.
The remainder of this Essay is as follows. Part II offers an
overview of the evidence. Part III briefly explores an objection to
the effect that partyism is a legitimate product of substantive
disagreements. Part IV explores the causes of partyism. Part V
identifies some bad consequences. Part VI turns to potential
solutions. Part VII concludes.
' Shanto lyengar, Guarav Sood & Yphtach Lelkes, Affect, Not Ideology: A Social
Identity Perspective on Polarization, 76 PUB. OPIN. Q. 405, 407 (2012), available at
http://pcl.stanford.edu/researchl2012/iyengar-poq-affect-not-ideology.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/A4ZQ-ZH73 ("We show that Democrats and Republicans not only
increasingly dislike the opposing party, but also impute negative traits to the rank-and-
file of the out-party.").
2 For a related conclusion, see Jody Freeman & David Spence, Old Statutes, New
Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014) ("To the extent that agencies do the President's
bidding, congressional weakness can also enhance presidential influence over policy.").
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II. PARTYISM: THE EVIDENCE
There is a great deal of evidence of partyism and its growth.
Perhaps the simplest involves "thermometer ratings."3 With
those ratings, people are asked to rate a range of groups on a
scale of 0 to 100, where 100 means that the respondent feels
"warm" toward the group and 0 means that the respondent feels
"cold." In-party rankings have remained stable over the last
three decades, with both Democrats and Republicans ranking
members of their own party around 70.4 By contrast, ratings of
the out-party has experienced a remarkable fifteen-point dip
since 1988.5 In 2008, the average out-party ranking was around
30-and it apparently continues to decline.6
By contrast, Republicans ranked "people on welfare," in
2008, at 50, and Democrats ranked "Big Business" at 51.7 It is
remarkable but true that negative affect toward the opposing
party is not merely greater than negative affect toward
unwelcome people and causes; it is much greater.
A. Implicit Discriminatory Associations: Party and Race
Consider one of the most influential measures of prejudice:
the implicit-association test (IAT). 8 The test is simple to take.
Participants see words on the upper corners of a screen-for
example, "white" paired with either "good" or "bad" in the upper
left corner, and "black" paired with one of those same adjectives
in the upper right. Then they see a picture or a word in the
middle of the screen-for example, a white face, an African-
American face, or the word "joy" or "terrible." The task is to click
on the upper corner that matches either the picture or the word
in the middle.
See Iyengar et al., supra note 1, at 410-411.
4 Id. at 412.
5 Id.
Id. at 413.
See lyengar et al., supra note 1, at 413.
8 See generally Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L. K.
Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit
Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998) (explaining the IAT
test's goals, methods, and results); N. Sriram & Anthony G. Greenwald, The Brief
Implicit Association Test, 56 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 283, 283 (2009) ("In eleven years
since its introduction, the Implicit Association Test ... has been used in several hundred
studies to provide measures of association strengths.").
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Many white people quickly associate positive words like
"joy," or an evidently European-American (Caucasian) face, with
the upper left corner when it says "white" and "good," but have a
much harder time associating "joy" with the left corner when the
words there are "black" and "good."9 So too, many white people
quickly associate "terrible" with the left corner when it says
"black" and "bad," but proceed a lot more slowly when the left
corner says "white" and "bad."10 And when the picture in the
middle is evidently of a European American (Caucasian), white
people are a lot faster in associating it with the word "good" than
when the picture is evidently of an African-American.11
It is tempting to think that racial prejudice is deeply
engrained and that nothing comparable can be found in the
political domain, at least with respect to the two major parties in
the United States. (To be sure, we might expect to see strongly
negative implicit attitudes for "Nazis" or "Communists.") To test
for political prejudice, Shanto Iyengar and Sean Westwood,
political scientists at Stanford University, conducted a large-
scale implicit association test with 2,000 adults. 12 They found
people's political bias to be much larger than their racial bias.
When Democrats see "joy," it is much easier for them to click on
a corner that says "Democratic" and "good" than on one that
says "Republican" and "good." Implicit bias across racial lines
remains significant, but it is significantly greater across
political lines.13
9 See, e.g., Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1474; Scott A.
Ottaway, Davis C. Hayden & Mark A. Oakes, Implicit Attitudes and Racism: Effects of
Word Familiarity and Frequency on the Implicit Association Test, 19 Soc. COGNITION 97,
130 (2001) ("We found large implicit racism effects for African American-Caucasian
evaluative contrasts."); Shanto lyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fear and Loathing Across
Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization 12 (June, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://pcl.stanford.edu/researchl2014/iyengar-ajps-group-
polarization.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NEG8-HWBH ("[Wihites displayed a
somewhat stronger in-group preference.").
'o See sources cited in supra note 9.
"' This is a slight simplification of how the test works. See sources cited in supra
note 9.
12 lyengar & Westwood, supra note 9, at 9.
13 Id. at 12 ("[T]he separation of the distributions appears larger between
Republicans and Democrats than between Whites and African Americans.").
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B. Love and Marriage: Partyism and Romantic Life
If you are a Democrat, would you marry a Republican?
Would you be upset if your sister did? Researchers have long
asked such questions about race and have found that, along
important dimensions, racial prejudice is decreasing. 1 4 At the
same time, party prejudice in the United States has jumped,
infecting not only politics but also decisions about marriage. In
1960, just 5 percent of Republicans and 4 percent of Democrats
said that they would feel "displeased" if their son or daughter
married outside their political party. 15 By 2010, those numbers
had reached 49 percent and 33 percent, respectively. 16
Interestingly, comparable increases cannot be found in the
United Kingdom.1 7
In 2011, by contrast, 63 percent of Americans reported that
they "would be fine" if a member of their family married
someone of any other race or ethnicity, a sharp change from as
recently as 1986, when 65 percent of respondents said that
interracial marriage was not fine for anyone or not fine for
them.1 8 When asked specifically about marriages between
African-American and white partners, only 6 percent of white
respondents and 3 percent of African-Americans recently said
that "they could not accept a black-white interracial marriage in
their family." 19 Similarly, a recent Gallup survey found that 87
percent of people approve of interracial marriage, while 4
percent did in 1958-a dramatic shift in social norms, showing
the opposite trend-line from that observed for partyism. 20
14 See lyengar et al., supra note 1, at 416 (showing a steady decrease in racial
polarization from 1964 to 2008).
" Id. at 415-18.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 418 ("Social distance between partisans in the United States significantly
exceeds the corresponding distance in the United Kingdom.").
1s See Wendy Wang et al., The Rise Of Intermarriage 7 (Pew Research Center,
2012), available at http: /www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/SDT-Intermarriage-
II.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5CP3-TTTA.
19 Id. at 36.
20 Frank Newport, In U.S., 87% Approve of Black-White Marriage, vs. 4% in 1958,
(Gallup, July 25, 2013), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/163697/approve-
marriage-blacks-whites.aspx, archived at http: //perma.ce/GPX6-EVQ2.
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C. Not Hiring? Partyism in the Employment Market
The IAT measures attitudes, not behavior. Growing
disapproval of marriage across political lines suggests an
increase in prejudice and hostility, but it might not map onto
actual conduct. To investigate behavior, lyengar and Westwood
asked more than 1,000 people to look at the resumes of several
high-school seniors and say which ones should be awarded a
scholarship. 21 Some of these resumes contained explicitly racial
cues ("president of the African American Student Association")
while others had explicitly political ones ("president of the
Young Republicans"). 2 2
In terms of ultimate judgments, race certainly mattered:
African-American participants preferred the African-American
scholarship candidates 73 percent to 27 percent.23 For their part,
whites showed a modest preference for African-American
candidates as well, though by a significantly smaller margin.24
But party affiliation made a much larger difference. Both
Democrats and Republicans selected their in-party candidate
about 80 percent of the time. 25 Even when a candidate from the
opposing party had better credentials, most people chose the
candidate from their own party. 26 With respect to race, in
contrast, merit prevailed.27 It is worth underlining this finding:
racial preferences were eliminated when one candidate was
clearly better than the other. By contrast, party preferences lead
people to choose a clearly inferior candidate.
A similar study asked students to play the role of college
admissions director and to decide which applicants to invite for
an on-campus interview, based on both objective criteria (SAT
scores, class rank) and subjective evidence (teacher
recommendations). 28 Among partisans with strong party
21 lyengar & Westwood, supra note 9, at 14.
22 Id. at 15.
23 Id. at 16.
24 Id. ("European Americans showing a small preference for the African American
candidate (55.8% selecting the African American).").
25 lyengar & Westwood, supra note 9, at 15-16.
26 Id. at 16-17.
27 Id. at 18.
28 Geoffrey D. Munro, Terell P. Lasane & Scott P. Leary, Political Partisan
Prejudice: Selective Distortion and Weighting of Evaluative Categories in College
Admissions Applications, 40 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 2434, 2440 (2010).
6 [ 2015
PARTYISM
identification, there was significant evidence of partyism: 44
percent of the participants reviewing someone from the opposite
party selected the stronger applicant, while 79 percent of the
participants in the control (where participants had no
knowledge of the applicant's party affiliation) selected the
stronger applicant.29
D. Distrusting the Other Side? Partyism and Trust
In a further test of the relationship between partyism and
actual behavior, Iyengar and Westwood asked more than 800
people to play "the trust game," 30 well known among behavioral
scientists.31 As the game is played, Player 1 is given some money
(say, $10) and told that she can give some, all, or none of it to
Player 2.32 Player 1 is then told that the researcher will triple
the amount that she allocates to Player 2 and that Player 2 can
give some of that back to Player 1. When Player 1 decides how
much money to give Player 2, a central question is how well she
trusts him to return an equivalent or greater amount. Higher
levels of trust will result in higher initial allocations.
Are people less willing to trust people of a different race or
party affiliation? lyengar and Westwood found that race did not
matter-but party did.3 3 People are significantly more trusting
of others who share their party affiliation. 34
E. Other Evidence of Partyism
There is a great deal of additional evidence of partyism. For
example, partyism can motivate partisans to be especially
inclined to share negative information about the opposing
party-or even to avoid its members altogether when forming a
group.35 In one experiment, participants were asked to decide
29 Id. at 2444.
3o lyengar & Westwood, supra note 9, at 20.
3' Cf. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the
Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285 (1986) (exploring people's adverse reactions
to perceived unfairness).
32 lyengar & Westwood, supra note 9, at 19-20.
3 Id. at 22.
3 Id. at 21-23.
, See generally Yphtach Lelkes & Sean J. Westwood, The Nature and Limits of
Partisan Prejudice (Aug. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://web.
stanford.edul-seanjw/papers/Limits-ofPartisanDiscrimination.pdf, archived at http://
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whether a strongly worded opinion piece blaming congressional
gridlock on one of the two political parties, including hyperbole
and name calling, should be posted on a news organization's
website. 36 The researchers found significant evidence of
partyism: 65 percent of people were willing to post the article if
it was critical of the opposing party, but only 25 percent were
willing to share it if it criticized their own party.37 They also
found that the intensity of a participant's partisan feelings
correlated with their willingness to share a critical article. 38
In a second experiment, the researchers asked participants
to pick a team of three people out of a list of four to join them in
completing a puzzle game. 39 Participants were informed of the
partisan identity and education level of the potential
teammates; the least-educated team member was always an
independent. More than half the participants selected the least
educated player for their team-rather than choosing a better-
educated member of the opposing party!40 This finding is both
disturbing and revealing. It suggests that for certain tasks,
people will choose colleagues of the same political party even
when doing so makes successful completion of the task
significantly less likely.
III. AN OBJECTION: ISN'T PARTYISM LEGITIMATE?
From these studies, and various others, 41 it seems clear that
partyism is widespread in the United States. We can imagine
reasonable disputes about the precise magnitude of the
perma.cc/4YU4-HQNH ("While we find that partisan prejudice predicts promotion of
hostile rhetoric and avoidance of members of the opposition, it is not related to
discriminatory behavior.").
3 Id. at 9.
3 Id. at 10.
3 Id. at 11.
39 See Lelkes & Westwood, supra note 35, at 13-14.
40 Id. at 14. Note, however, that there are significant qualifications to this finding,
with some reluctance to discriminate along party lines. Id.
41 See, e.g., Lilliana Mason, "I Disrespectfully Agree'" The Differential Effects of
Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 128, 128 (2015)
(arguing "that sorting itself has been responsible for increased levels of partisanship and
polarized behavior, including partisan bias, activism, and anger"); Adrian Furnham,
Factors Relating to the Allocation of Medical Resources, 11 J. Soc. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY 615, 620 (1996) ("There was a politics-of-patient x politics-of-subject
interaction (F(3, 117) = 5.01, p < .001) which indicated clear in-group favouritism,
notably that left-wing voters favoured left-wing patients and vice versa.").
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phenomenon, but not of its existence and significance. But there
is an obvious objection to the effort to compare racism to
partyism, or indeed to the very effort to describe partyism as
seriously troubling. The objection is that people have legitimate
reasons for objecting to others because of their political beliefs.
People often commit themselves to a party because of their
convictions, 4 2 not because of anything illicit. If we think that
Communism is hateful, we will not object to those who do not
much like Communists. "Red-baiting" is not exactly admirable,
but it would not be helpful to identify and to object
to "Communism."
For some people, a degree of suspicion and hostility across
political lines is a product of legitimate disagreement, not of
anything untoward. Political disagreements can be matters of
principle. Racism and sexism are products of devaluation of
human beings on the basis of an immutable or at least
irrelevant characteristic. Perhaps the same cannot be said for
party affiliation. In fact, the very idea of political prejudice, or
any kind of corresponding "ism," might seem badly misdirected.
Perhaps we are speaking here not of any kind of prejudice, but
of a considered judgment about people who hold certain
convictions. On certain assumptions, and if the judgment takes
a particular form, that is the precise opposite of prejudice. At the
very least, it is judgment, and not prejudice at all.
To come to terms with this response, we need to begin by
distinguishing between daily life and politics as such. It is
hardly unreasonable to have a strong negative affect toward
Nazis or Communists because of their political views. But if
people actually dislike each other because of an affiliation with
one of the major parties in the United States, or do not want to
deal with one another in the workplace, something does seem
badly amiss. To be sure, some characteristics or even
commitments of one or another party might seem troublesome or
worse. But both parties are large and diverse, and it is odd to
think that outside of the political domain, members of one party
should actually dislike members of another party as such.
Of course this judgment turns on substantive conclusions. If
you believe that Republicans are essentially racists and sexists,
42 Of course this is too simple. Some people become committed to parties because of
family circumstances, or other social influences, that may not be adequately captured by
the idea of "convictions."
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antipathy toward Republicans is understandable, and so too if
you believe that Democrats are unpatriotic socialists who do not
appreciate and who seek to undermine the United States. But if
you believe that across the two parties, good-faith disagreements
are possible and pervasive, partyism will be hard to defend, not
least if it seeps into daily life.
In the political domain, of course, intensely held differences
are common, and some kind of "we-they" attitude may be
difficult or impossible to avoid. For members of Congress, such
an attitude is, in a sense, built into the very structure of the
two-party system. A degree of antipathy-at least if it is not
personal-may reflect principled disagreement, not prejudice at
all. But there is a large difference between a degree of antipathy
and the forms of partyism we are now observing.
Most of the time, it is best to avoid any kind of antipathy
toward people with whom you intensely disagree in your day job.
True, for some people, some of the time, a degree of antipathy
might be hard to avoid. Even if this is so, the problem is that
good faith disagreement is far from uncommon in politics, and in
the face of such disagreement, the task is to seek to identify
ways to move forward (or not), rather than to block proposals or
to discredit arguments because of their source. With respect to
politics itself, something like partyism may be a product of
principle, but it has turned into a pernicious form of prejudice. It
also has destructive consequences, as we shall shortly see.
IV. WHAT CAUSES PARTYISM?
What causes partyism? We do not yet know the answer, but
some helpful clues have started to emerge. Modern political
campaigns are a significant factor, and there is reason to think
that a highly polarized and fragmented media market
contributes as well.
A. From Ideological Disagreement to Partyism?
It is tempting to think that the growth in partyism is a
product of the increasing intensity and visibility of ideological
disagreements. Let us assume that at some point in the past-
say, 1970-one or another of the two parties, or perhaps both,
had a "wider tent." Let us assume, in fact, that the conservative
wing of the Democratic Party was more conservative than the
liberal wing of the Republican Party, so that the two parties had
10 [ 2015
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significant ideological overlap. If so, we would not expect to see
much in the way of partyism.
This hypothesis could be tested in multiple ways. We could
attempt to track ideological differences between the parties and
test whether growth in ideological distance turned out to be
correlated with increases in partyism. A strong correlation
would not be definitive, but it would be at least suggestive. It
would indicate that strong negative affect, across political lines,
would have something to do with increasingly intense
substantive disagreements. And if this turned out to be so, the
rise of partyism would, in a sense, turn out to be rational, at
least in the sense that prejudice and antipathy would be a
product of something concrete and real. The role of partyism in
the private domain would remain hard to defend, but in politics,
at least, its recent increase would be comprehensible.
But a better way to test the hypothesis would be to see
whether the intensity of people's policy preferences predicts
partyism. In other words: when people have very strong views
about political issues, and when those very strong views suggest
clear divisions across party lines, are they more likely to show a
negative affect toward the opposing party? Surprisingly, the
connection between ideological polarization and negative affect is
relatively weak.43 It appears that people's partisan attachments
are a product of their identity rather than their ideology. When
Republicans dislike Democrats, or vice versa, it is largely
because they are on the opposing side; substantive
disagreements matter, to be sure, but they are not the major
sources of partyism.44
B. Negative Campaigns and the Intensification of Partyism
Do political campaigns create partyism? It is natural to
suspect that they do, first because they make party differences
salient, and second because part of the point is to cast the
opposing side in a negative light. Iyengar and Westwood find
strong support for this hypothesis. In particular, exposure to
negative advertising contributes to a growth in partisan animus,
and political campaigns themselves have that effect.45
4 See lyengar et al., supra note 1, at 421-24; Mason, supra note 41, at 141-42.
44 See lyengar et al., supra note 1, at 424; Mason, supra note 41, at 141-42.
4s lyengar et al., supra note 1, at 424-27 (finding that residence in a battleground
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Apparently campaigns serve to "prime" partisan identity and
also support stereotypical and negative perceptions of both
supporters and opponents.
C. Your Media, My Media
In a fragmented media market, it is easy for people to
segregate along partisan lines. Fox News has an identifiable
conservative orientation; MSNBC has an identifiable liberal
orientation. Some talk shows are easy to characterize in terms of
the political commitments of the host. If a show or a station
characterizes one group of people as "the other side," and if those
on that side are described as malicious, foolish, or power-hungry,
then viewers or listeners should experience a rise in partyism. 46
We do not have clear data on this particular speculation, but
some is emerging, 47 and it is reasonable to suspect that a
fragmented media market, with clear political identifications,
contributes a great deal to partyism.
V. SOME BAD CONSEQUENCES OF PARTYISM
Is partyism harmful? On one view, it is a logical and
acceptable product, in certain times and places, of a healthy
system of democratic self-government, one that includes checks
and balances. In my view, that perspective is far too optimistic.
A central goal of a well-functioning system of self-government is
state during an election year correlates significantly with intensity of partisan affect,
and that partisan affect increases significantly over the course of a campaign, especially
in battleground states); see also Guarav Sood, Shanto lyengar & Kyle Dropp, Coming to
Dislike Your Opponents: The Polarizing Impact of Political Campaigns 3 (Jan. 19, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.gsood.com/research/papers/ComingToDislike.pdf, archived at
http: /perma.cc/E9CR-PVY3 (finding that over the course of a campaign, partisans form
more negative views of the opposing party, and the most strongly correlated feature is
exposure to televised political advertising, especially negative ads).
' For relevant discussion, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 46-78 (2007).
47 See Yphtach Lelkes, Shanto Iyengar & Gaurav Sood, The Hostile Audience:
Selective Exposure to Partisan Sources and Affective Polarization 3 (Apr. 30, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://pel.stanford.edu/teaching/nustlelkes-
hostile.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S97M-HMKB (finding that for partisans who pay
attention to politics, cable access is correlated with greater partisan affect in years when
cable carried partisan content, and further finding that the preference of partisans for
choosing, between MSNBC and Fox News, the news sources amenable to their party "in
and of itself is sufficient to predict partisan animus, greater affect for in-party elites vis-
a-vis out-party elites, greater social distance between partisans, and a preference for
attack-oriented campaign rhetoric").
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to increase social welfare, suitably specified, and there are good
reasons to think that, under circumstances of severe partyism,
that goal will be far more difficult to achieve. This conclusion
cannot be defended rigorously. It depends on understandings
about what would increase social welfare and about how
partyism undermines that goal. But as we shall see, the
conclusion is more than mere speculation.
A. Source Devaluation and Political Polarization
Suppose that a society is divided on some proposition. The
first group believes A and the second group believes not-A.
Suppose that the first group is correct. Suppose finally that
truthful information is provided, not from members of the first
group but from some independent source, in support of A. It
would be reasonable to suppose that the second group would
come to believe A. But in important settings, the opposite
happens. The second group continues to believe not-A, and even
more firmly than before. The result of the correction is to
increase polarization.
The underlying studies do not involve party differences as
such, but they explore something very close to that, and they
suggest the following proposition: an important consequence of
partyism is to ensure that people with a strong political
identification will be relatively immune from corrections, even on
matters of fact, from people who do not share that identification.
Since agreement on matters of fact is often a precondition
for political progress, this phenomenon can be
extremely destructive.
In a relevant experiment, people were exposed to a mock
news article in which President George W. Bush defended the
Iraq war, in part by suggesting (as President Bush in fact did)
that "[t]here was a risk, a real risk, that Saddam Hussein would
pass weapons or materials or information to terrorist
networks." 48 After reading this article, they read about the
Duelfer Report, which documented the lack of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) in Iraq.49 Subjects were then asked to state
their agreement, on a five-point scale (from "strongly agree" to
4 Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of
Political Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 312 (2010).
49 Id. at 313.
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"strongly disagree"), with the statement that Iraq "had an active
weapons of mass destruction program, the ability to produce
these weapons, and large stockpiles of WVMD."50
The effect of the correction greatly varied by political
ideology. For very liberal subjects, there was a modest shift in
favor of disagreement with this statement; the shift was not
significant, because very liberal subjects already tended to
disagree with it.51 But for those who characterized themselves as
conservative, there was a statistically significant shift in the
direction of agreeing with the statement: "In other words, the
correction backfired-conservatives who received a correction
telling them that Iraq did not have WMVD were more likely to
believe that Iraq had WMD than those in the control
condition."52 It follows that the correction had a polarizing effect;
it divided people more sharply, on the issue at hand, than they
had been divided before.
An independent application of the same study confirmed the
more general effect. People were asked to evaluate the
proposition that cutting taxes is so effective in stimulating
economic growth that it actually increases government
revenue. 53 They were then asked to read a correction. The
correction actually increased people's commitments to the
proposition in question: "Conservatives presented with evidence
that tax cuts do not increase government revenues ended up
believing this claim more fervently than those who did not
receive a correction." 54
Or consider a test of whether apparently credible media
corrections alter the belief, supported and pressed by former
Alaska Governor Sarah Palin, that the Affordable Care Act
would create "death panels."5 5 Among those who viewed Palin
favorably but had limited political knowledge, the correction
succeeded; it also succeeded among those who view Palin
unfavorably.5 6 But the correction actually backfired among Palin
o Id. at 312-13.
' Id. at 314.
52 Nyhan & Reifler, supra note 48, at 314-15.
53 Id. at 319.
54 Id. at 320.
5 Brendan Nyhan, Jason Reifler & Peter A. Ubel, The Hazards of Correcting Myths
About Health Care Reform, 51 MED. CARE 127, 127 (2013).
56 Id. at 129-30.
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supporters with a high degree of political knowledge. After
receiving the correction, they became more likely to believe that
the Affordable Care Act contained death panels. 5
Liberals (and Democrats) are hardly immune to this effect.
In 2005, many liberals wrongly believed that President George
W. Bush had imposed a ban on stem cell research.58 Presented
with a correction from The New York Times or FoxNews.com,
liberals generally continued to believe what they did before.5 9 By
contrast, conservatives accepted the correction. 60 Hence the
correction produced an increase in polarization.
As noted, the relevant experiments involve people with clear
ideological (rather than partisan) convictions, and there appears
to be no clear evidence on the specific question whether the
same effects would be observed for party. But in light of the
general evidence of partyism, there is every reason to believe
that they would. Indeed, an important and related study shows
that people will follow the views of their party even when those
views diverge from their independent judgments-and also that
they are blind to the effects of party influence. 61
In the relevant study, people-both Democrats and
Republicans-were asked their views about an assortment of
political issues. As a result, it was possible to obtain a sense of
how members of both parties thought about those issues.
Otherwise identical groups were then asked about the same
issues, but with one difference: they were informed of the views
of party leadership. The effect of that information was
significant. Armed with that information, people departed from
the views that they would have held if they had not been so
armed. Stunningly, the effect of the information "overwhelmed
the impact of both the policy's objective impact and participants'
ideological beliefs."62
At the same time, people were blind to that impact; they
actually said that their judgments were based solely on the
merits, not on the effects of learning about the beliefs of party
5 Id.
5 Nyhan & Reifler, supra note 48, at 320-21.
` Id. at 321.
6 Id. at 321-22.
61 See generally Geoffrey Cohen, Party Over Policy, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 808 (2003).
62 Id. at 808.
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leaders.63 Here, then, is clear evidence of the consequences of
partyism for people's judgments-and of people's unawareness
of that fact.
B. Gridlock
It might be expected that under circumstances of partyism,
legislation would be difficult to enact. If legislators themselves
suffer from partyism, this conclusion should seem self-evident.
And even if they do not-even if they feel no antagonism to
members of the opposing party and are fully willing to work
with them-constituent pressures should push in this direction.
In fact, recent evidence suggests that partyism has been
contributing to a highly unusual degree of inactivity
in Congress.
1. Measures.
During the year that Harry Truman complained of the "Do
Nothing Congress," 511 statutes were enacted (and that was
only one year of a two-year session). 64 The 113th Congress is the
second least productive since 1973, at least if measured by the
number of enacted statutes.65 The previous Congress enacted
the fewest (284).66 This dramatic decrease is not only a product
of a reduction in purely ceremonial legislation; fewer
substantive laws were enacted in the first nineteen months of
the 113th Congress than in any Congress of the preceding
two decades.67
It is true that a purely numerical measure will not be
adequate, even if it is focused only on substantive statutes. A
Congress might enact few laws, but those that it enacts might be
exceptionally important. By another and in some ways better
63 Id.
6 Matt Viser, This Congress Going Down As Least Productive, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
4, 2013, at Al, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/12/04/
congress-course-make-history-leastproductivelkGAVEBskUeqCB0htOUG9GI/story.html.
65 Bills by Final Status, available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
statistics, archived at http://perma.cc/5ZMR-PCMU (noting the 113th Congress passed
296 statutes).
66 Id.
67 Drew Desilver, Congress Continues Its Streak of Passing Few Significant Laws
(Pew Research Center, July 31, 2014), available at http: //www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/07/31/congress-continues-its-streak-of-passing-few-significant-laws/, archived
at http: /perma.cc/TCB7-T6D9.
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measure, Congress also appears to have become unusually
gridlocked. Sarah Binder assesses legislative gridlock by
examining what proportion of the most salient legislative issues
are acted on by Congress by the end of a congressional session.68
To assess issue salience, she investigated the number of
appearances an issue makes in The New York Times unsigned
editorials to assess issue salience. 69 She finds that the 112th
Congress, in session from 2011-12, was the most gridlocked in
the data set (tied only with 1999-2000), going back to 1947.70 By
her measure, more than 70 percent of all salient issues were
gridlocked in that Congress, compared to fewer than 30 percent
in 1947.71
2. Is gridlock bad?
There is of course a legitimate question whether gridlock is
good or bad. If an active Congress would reduce social welfare,
there would be a good argument for an inactive Congress. Social
welfare is the guide, not the volume of activity. A blocked
national legislature is something to lament only if the result, all
things considered, is to diminish social welfare. One issue is
whether and to what extent the legislative status quo is
wanting; if it is not, new enactments are not so desirable.
Another issue is whether new enactments would be
improvements; if they would not be, then gridlock is a blessing,
not a curse.
A full account of any particular state of affairs would
require a theory of optimal deadlock. This is not the place for
any such theory. But it seems reasonable to think that if a
nation faces a range of serious problems, if imaginable
initiatives would reduce or solve those problems, and if partyism
makes it difficult to undertake those initiatives, then something
is badly amiss. Any particular examples will be contentious, but
consider immigration reform, climate change, and social
6 See generally Sarah Binder, Polarized We Govern? (Brookings Center for Effective
Public Management, May 2014), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/medial
researchlfiles/papers/2014/05/27%20polarized%20we%20govern%20binder/brookingscep
m-polarized-figreplacedtextrevtablerev.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/456B-DXXP.
" Id. at 5.
70 Id. at 9.
71 Id. at 9-10. Data on the 113th Congress was not available when this study was
published.
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security. In each of these areas, significant reforms would be
highly desirable, but in part because of partyism, they do not
appear possible, at least as of this writing.
VI. SOLUTIONS
My principal goal here has been positive rather than
normative. It is possible to believe that partyism is growing and
real but that nothing should be done about it. But I have also
suggested that the increase in partyism has produced serious
problems for the American government. How might political
actors and institutions respond?
It is tempting to urge that we should aim at its causes, to
the extent that we are able to identify them. That would
certainly be the most direct and ambitious response. But James
Madison's words of the Federalist No. 10, applied to the related
phenomenon of faction, are highly relevant here:
Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment
without which it instantly expires. But it could not be
less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political
life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish
the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life,
because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. 72
With Madison's caution in mind, we should acknowledge
that it would be folly to attempt to abolish partyism. To be sure,
the nature and degree of partyism are not static. As we have
seen, partyism has increased significantly in recent decades, and
it might turn out to be much lower in 2035 than it is in 2015.
But changes of that kind cannot easily be engineered. They are
more likely to be a function of an array of social forces, including
emerging technologies, invisible-hand mechanisms, and the
decentralized decisions of a wide range of private and
public actors.
The real solutions lie not in aiming at the causes of
partyism but in working to counteract its effects. Consider three
possibilities: (1) taking action in periods in which partyism is
likely to be least acute and least damaging; (2) precommitment
strategies; and (3) delegation. In particular, I suggest that under
circumstances of partyism, there is especially good reason to be
72 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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receptive to exercises of authority by the executive branch-not
unconstrained, of course, but somewhat broader than would
otherwise be desirable or appropriate.
A. Timing Is Everything
For obvious reasons, partyism is likely to be most intense
before a presidential or mid-term election. At that point,
negative campaigning will be heightened, and politicians might
well be at risk if they attempt to make common cause with those
from the opposing party. By contrast, partyism is likely to be
reduced in the immediate aftermath of a presidential campaign,
when the newly elected Commander-in-Chief typically enjoys
what is known as a "honeymoon period."73 The term is a good
one, because it captures a central feature of the immediate
aftermath of an election, which is that a new relationship is
created with a kind of warm glow. In the presence of that glow,
partyism is diminished, at least for a time, and it may be
possible to accomplish a great deal.
The point suggests the immense importance of the period of
presidential transition, and the need for a president-elect to
focus carefully on the top priorities of her or his first term. Clear
identification of those priorities, alongside a strategy for
bringing them to fruition, has long been exceedingly important.
But under conditions of partyism, it is essential to any
president-elect, and potentially to the nation as a whole.
B. Precommitment Strategies
Under creatively designed laws, significant reform can
happen as a result of congressional inaction. Consider, for
example, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of
1990,74 which enables the president to appoint the eight
members of a base-closing commission.75 The commission
produces a list of recommended military-base closures, and if the
president approves, they happen-unless Congress enacts a
1 See Presidential Approval Ratings-Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends,
(Gallup), available at http: //www.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-
gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx, archived at http: //perma.ce /7KT9-
BAUM?type=live (noting the approval ratings of all Presidents since Harry Truman
decline over the course of their respective presidencies).
7' Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 10 U.S.C. §2867 (1990).
7 Id.
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resolution of disapproval within 45 days. If Congress does
nothing, the closures go into effect.76
A more controversial example is known as "the sequester."77
In 2011, Congress and President Obama completed a difficult
negotiation by agreeing that unless Congress enacted new
legislation, automatic (and aggressive) spending cuts would go
into effect in 2013.78 At the time, few people favored the
automatic cuts; they saw them as a mechanism to force
Congress to do its job. But the sequester did go into effect, and
for better or worse, it has had major effects on federal spending.
The power of the 2011 decision was that it established a drastic
outcome if Congress failed to act. The noteworthy surprise was
that as a result of partyism, the default outcome actually went
into effect.
If the goal is to reform Social Security, to make significant
changes in fiscal policy, or to achieve any other large-scale goal,
it is possible to imagine a strategy of this kind. With or without
the help of a commission, Congress could allow specified reforms
to occur on a specified date unless a future Congress says
otherwise. Of course there is a serious challenge to efforts of this
kind: solutions to the problem of partyism might be defeated by
partyism. But in some cases, some kind of precommitment
strategy, or an alteration of the status quo, has sufficient appeal
to be feasible.
76 Id.
77 Budget Control Act of 2011, 2 U.S.C. § 900 (2011).
78 Id.
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C. Delegation and Technocracy
In many cases, the best response to partyism lies in
reasonable delegation, and in particular in strengthening the
hand of technocratic forces within government. The basic idea is
that the resolution of many political questions should not turn
on politics, at least not in any simple or crude sense. Partyism is
unhelpful, because partisan differences are irrelevant or nearly
so. Consider these problems:
Should the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
reduce the permissible level of ozone in the ambient air
from 75 parts per billion (ppb) to 70 ppb, 65 ppb, or 60
ppb?
Should the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) issue a new rule to control
exposure to silica in the construction industry?
Should the Department of Transportation require
rearview cameras to be installed in new automobiles?
Should the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ban
asthma inhalers that emit chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)?
All of these questions are highly technical. They cannot
possibly be answered without careful engagement with
empirical issues. Policymakers need to know the benefits of
imaginable policies in terms of health and safety. They also need
to know the costs, monetary and otherwise. Would a new rule for
silica cost $100 million, or $500 million, or $1 billion? What
would be the consequences of those costs? Would they result in
fewer jobs or in reduced wages? What are the actual harms
associated with exposure to silica at various levels? With
proposed regulations, how many lives would be saved?
To be sure, judgments of value may play a role in
controversies of this kind, but with imaginable empirical
projections, there may be sufficient consensus to ensure
agreement on particular outcomes, even amidst significant
differences in value and across party lines. If, for example, a
silica regulation would cost $1 billion and save merely two lives
per year, few people would support it, whatever their party
affiliation. And if it would cost $100 million and save 700 lives
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per year, few people would reject it. In any event, it is hopeless
to try to answer many of the central questions by reference to
one's party identification.
No one denies that Republicans and Democrats have
significantly different attitudes toward the EPA and OSHA, and
those different attitudes might well lead to disagreements about
particular initiatives. But there is another point, and it is what I
am emphasizing here: many disagreements are not really about
values or partisan commitments, but about facts, and when facts
are sufficiently engaged, disagreements across party lines will
often melt away. In the face of certain factual showings,
Republicans and Democrats will agree, and apparently
intractable and intense forms of disagreements-prompted by
partyism-might look like dogmatism, pointless abstractions, or
even hot air. It is for this reason that whether the President is a
Republican or a Democrat, technocrats within the federal
government are exceedingly important, and can and will come
into accord.
Of course there are many issues for which this is not easy or
possible. In areas that are politically inflamed, values may well
be primary, and they might produce enduring disagreements
across party lines. But for numerous questions, including those
sketched above, there is a reasonable hope that immersion in
the facts will be sufficient, and that party differences are far less
important than they might seem.
In these circumstances, broad delegations to the executive
branch make a great deal of sense, at least (and this is an
important proviso) if officials within that branch can be trusted
to make decisions with careful reference to the facts. In my view,
institutional characteristics of the executive branch justify a
degree of trust, certainly not always but at least as a general
rule. The reason is that the executive branch-again as a
general rule-tends both to have a great deal of technical
expertise and to treat technical issues as they should be treated.
Ironically, it has a degree of insulation from day-to-day politics,
enabling it to focus on questions as specialists do.79 To the extent
that this is so, there are significant advantages in allowing the
specialists to do their work, subject of course to ultimate
7 See CASs R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE, 11-
46 (2014) (discussing the highly technical quality of the work overseen by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs).
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legislative control, but not to the day-to-day conflicts made
inevitable by partyism.
Consider in this regard the Chevron principle, which of
course allows agency interpretations to receive deference in the
face of ambiguous statutory terms. The best understanding of
the principle is that it reflects Congress's (fictional) instructions:
resolution of ambiguity often calls for a judgment of policy, and
those judgments should be made by agencies, not courts,
especially in light of the fact that agencies have greater
technical capacities as well as greater accountability. I am
emphasizing the technical point here. Where specialized
knowledge is required, there is good reason for courts to allow
reasonable interpretations by the executive branch.
If this is so, then partyism provides yet another reason to
embrace the Chevron principle.80 Indeed, we might be prepared
to go somewhat further. Some statutes-like some constitutional
provisions-endure for long periods of time and must be
construed across significant changes in both facts and values.
Of course the executive branch must respect the law as
Congress has enacted it. To be sure, entirely open-ended grants
of authority are in tension with national traditions and may
raise constitutional doubts. But we are not speaking of genuine
open-endedness-only of a significant disagree of discretion,
allowing adaptation to new circumstances and unanticipated
problems. Common law courts have long had the authority to
adapt statutory terms to new or unanticipated circumstances,
even when the interpretation fits awkwardly with the apparent
meaning of the text.81 Under circumstances of partyism, it is
plausible to think that agencies should have the same power-
and perhaps a bit more so. 82 The reason is that a well-
functioning nation requires adjustments across time, and
agencies are often in the best position to make those
so See Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
s' See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 516-17 (1892) ("It
is the duty of the courts, under those circumstances, to say that, however broad the
language of the statute may be, the act, although within the letter, is not within the
intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute."); Riggs v.
Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 510 (1889) ("Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as
will best answer the intention which the makers had in view, for qui haeret in litera,
haeret in cortice.").
82 For possible support, see Entergy v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (2009) (holding
that an agency may use means not mentioned specifically in the statute to promulgate
regulations).
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adjustments-and if it is riven by partyism, Congress is not
likely to have the capacity to do so.
Do the same arguments apply in the domain of foreign
affairs? That question raises many problems, and full argument
would require a far more detailed treatment than I am able to
provide here. 83 But here as well, the executive branch has
important informational advantages, and, at least under
circumstances of severe partyism, mandatory resort to Congress
could prevent highly desirable action. When circumstances
change in the world, action by the United States might have to
change as well, and if legislative authorization is invariably
required, desirable action might be prevented, at least under
conditions of partyism.
These points should not be misunderstood. I am not
suggesting that the President can make war on his own, violate
constitutional restrictions on his authority, disregard legal
requirements, or otherwise abandon the constitutional plan. But
Congress itself has to make decisions-for example, in
generating the text of an authorization for the use of military
force (AUMF)-and where threats to national security are real,
there are good arguments for a degree of breadth and flexibility
rather than narrowness and constraint. And where the text of
an AUMF is ambiguous, there are good arguments in favor of
the view that just as in the domestic sphere, the President
should have some scope for interpreting that text as he sees fit.84
Of course it is true that this argument will have little
appeal to those who believe that the executive branch itself
suffers from serious institutional biases, or who think that it is
important to impose sharp discipline on the discretion of the
executive branch. And it must be emphasized that I am not
arguing for a radical change in existing understandings or a
dramatic departure from the status quo. No one contends that
Congress should give genuinely blank checks to the executive.
The argument is only that in an era of partyism, there is
increased reason for allowing a significant degree of discretion-
and for judicial receptivity to agency decisions in the face of
genuine ambiguity.
83 For relevant discussion, see generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007).
8 See id. at 1193.
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D. A Note on the Fragility of Institutional Judgments
While the main goal here has been positive rather than
normative, we have seen that an understanding of the problem
of partyism fortifies the case for certain forms of executive
action, and for receptivity to a degree of discretion on the part of
the executive branch. It is important to acknowledge, however,
that in practice, people's judgments about the authority of the
executive are greatly and even decisively affected by their
approval or disapproval of the incumbent president.85 Under a
Republican president, Democrats do not approve of the idea of a
discretion-wielding chief executive, enabled by deferential
courts. Under a Democratic president, Republicans tend to have,
and even to voice, the same cautions and concerns. During the
George W. Bush Administration, it was common for Democrats
to object to an overreaching executive and to argue for regular
resort to the national legislation. During the Obama
Administration, Democrats have rarely taken such positions,
and Republicans have made arguments against executive
discretion that they eschewed under Republican leadership.
In this respect, some of the most important institutional
judgments are fragile and even unstable. They are weakly held
in the sense that they predictably "flip" with changes in the
allocation of political power. We could even see institutional
judgments as victims of partyism itself. Questions of
institutional authority are, in a sense, overwhelmed by short-
term assessments of the particular people who are currently
occupying relevant offices. For this reason, it is possible that
evaluations of arguments in favor a receptive approach to
presidential power in light of partyism will be dominated by one
factor: evaluation of the current occupant of the Oval Office.
The aspiration, of course, is that institutional claims can be
evaluated behind a kind of veil of ignorance, and that short-term
considerations about the immediate winners and losers might be
put to one side. For political actors, of course, adoption of a veil
of ignorance is extremely challenging, because short-term
electoral considerations often argue against it. If, for example, a
Republican politician argues for acceptance of presidential
" See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops 11 (PUB. LAW AND
LEG. THEORY, Working Paper No. 501, 2015), available at http: /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=2553285, abstract archived at http: /perma.cc/J2MY-LWAD.
1] 25
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
discretion when the President is a Democrat, she might
seriously endanger her political prospects. Even for observers,
the challenge is also real, because short-term political
considerations have such salience. My hope is that the standard
claims on behalf of executive authority-strengthened in the
face of partyism-can be seen to rest on assumptions that while
hardly irresistible, are plausible enough, both now and for the
foreseeable future.
VII. CONCLUSION
Partyism is real, and it is increasing, and it has serious adverse
effects both in daily life and in the political domain. It makes
governance more difficult and, in some cases, even impossible.
Even when legislators are aware that a bipartisan agreement
would be sensible, they might well be under severe electoral
pressure not to enter into it, because they might face some kind
of reprisal from constituents or colleagues. There is an optimal
level of checking and balancing, and the United States has
exceeded that level.
Even under current conditions, the effects of partyism have
been far more serious in some periods than in others. On the eve
of a midterm election, for example, those effects are likely to be
heightened. In the six months after a presidential election, they
are likely to be reduced. But for structural reasons, large-scale
reductions in partyism are unlikely, certainly in the short-term.
Is this a problem? The ultimate criterion is social welfare,
suitably specified. If the statutory status quo is pretty good, and
if further action from the national government would likely
make things worse, then there would be little reason to lament
the existence of partyism. In such circumstances, partyism
might turn out to be a valuable safeguard. But if a nation faces
serious problems, and if imaginable initiatives would helpfully
address them, then partyism might turn out to create significant
dangers for both peace and prosperity. There is a strong
argument that under current conditions, partyism is seriously
reducing social welfare in the United States.
At least in the immediate future, it seems unlikely that the
United States will be able to make significant progress in
reducing the causes of partyism. If such reductions are to occur,
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it will probably be a product of spontaneous forces rather than of
any kind of self-conscious design. The best hope lies in reducing
partyism's effects. I have suggested that the most promising
approach lies in welcoming relatively broad delegations of
authority, emphasizing technocratic expertise, and in a receptive
approach to the Chevron principle, allowing adaptations
(not violations) of statutory text to changing values
and circumstances.

